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Distributing Legitimacy: The Politics of Milk in Post-World War II 
Venezuela 
Questions of how best to feed the urban masses in an economy largely dependent 
on petroleum have permeated Venezuela’s domestic and international political 
spheres since World War II. A state-initiated project, run by American capitalists 
under the direction of Nelson Rockefeller, developed Venezuela’s milk 
distribution system into one of the country’s most important agrifood industries 
by the late 1960s. The ways in which the firm navigated complicated questions of 
legitimacy and trust in public and private organizations provide an illustrative 
example of the inherently complicated relationship between state and business in 
the political economy of food distribution.  
Keywords: Venezuela; milk distribution; dairy; legitimacy 
Introduction 
Food distribution in Venezuela is notoriously problematic. For a decade and a half, 
American and British newspapers have episodically drawn international attention to 
interminable queues and empty shelves at Venezuelan supermarkets. Such reporting 
generally lays the blame for food shortages and repeated bouts of hyperinflation on the 
socialist economic policies of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro. For right-wing 
propagandists, the ready availability of photographs of Venezuela’s failures in food 
distribution provides easy fodder for ridiculing socialism and declaring the inherent 
superiority of capitalism.1 
But Venezuela’s contemporary food challenges have a much longer and more 
complicated history than such reports suggest. Although that history is extraordinary, it 
helps elucidate the ways in which the distribution of food is an inescapably politicized 
form of business enterprise. Indeed, since World War II, questions of how best to feed 
the urban masses in an economy largely dependent on petroleum have permeated 


































































the twentieth century, in fact, the political legitimacy of numerous regimes, ranging 
from social democratic governments to military dictatorships to revolutionary socialists, 
has been staked on promises of making Venezuela more self-sufficient and domestically 
secure in the production and distribution of food. And although contemporary 
commentators may think they are the first to suggest that Venezuela’s food problems at 
are the fault of its political leadership, one truism of Venezuelan economic history, as 
Ruth Capriles and Marisol Rodríguez de Gonzalo have noted, is “the frequency with 
which writers attribute the entire blame for the failures of economic development to the 
state.” Yet, as Capriles and Rodríguez note, “the relationship between the state and 
business or the state and the market is not one-way, or even two-way, but a multiple 
one.” This point is sharpened by recent research into Cold War communist enterprises; 
even when the state takes full responsibility for delivering goods and services and 
outlaws private business, managers must still engage in enterprise, and in doing so must 
navigate relationships far more complex than simple unidirectional command-and-
control directives from the state. In Venezuelan history—much the same as in any other 
nation, no matter the ideology of its political leadership—nothing has ever been 
particularly simple about business-government relations.2 
A state-initiated project in developing Venezuela’s milk distribution system after 
World War II provides an illustrative example of the complicated relationship between 
state and business. Prior to the arrival of the American businessmen, led by Nelson A. 
Rockefeller, who set up Industria Láctea de Carabobo (INLACA), Venezuela’s dairy 
economy was almost non-existent. By the end of the 1960s, however, dairying was 
economically more significant than the beef cattle industry—traditionally one of 
Venezuela’s most important enterprises—and INLACA was the largest and one of the 


































































were served and whose political legitimacy the firm helped support, however, remained 
in constant question. Both INLACA’s successes and failures in transforming the politics 
and business of the Venezuelan milk economy, sheds light on the fraught process of 
state intervention in agrifood systems that has long bedevilled the Venezuelan political 
economy of food distribution. 
 
The Food Problem in Venezuela 
Petroleum first became a major component of the Venezuelan economy in the 1920s, 
during the presidency of Juan Vicente Gómez. Tapped primarily by North American 
and European companies granted low-cost concessions by the dictatorial Gómez 
regime, oil decisively replaced agricultural products (coffee, cacao, and cattle hides) as 
Venezuela’s primary export during the Great Depression. When Gómez seized power in 
1908, Venezuela was self-sufficient in food production. By 1950, agriculture comprised 
less than one-tenth of the country’s GDP, the lowest share in all of Latin America, and 
the populace relied on imported food. The domestic political economy of agriculture 
and food nonetheless remained central to the nation’s efforts at state-building. As 
historian Doug Yarrington has shown, the rise of Venezuela’s modern state was 
grounded in no small part in Gómez’s dictatorial control over the nation’s cattle and 
meat business. After Gómez’s death in 1935, his military successor Eleazar López 
Contreras confronted rising demands from leftists for the dismantling of Gómez’s 
infrastructure of corruption. López Contreras forestalled demands for radical change in 
part by introducing several significant reforms in agrarian policy, including the promise 
of redistribution of land to peasants. And in 1937, López Contreras developed plans to 



































































By the onset of World War II, Venezuela’s economy involved an uneasy 
relationship between the international politics of oil and the domestic politics of food 
and agriculture. For U.S. petroleum firms and foreign policymakers, the possibility of 
Germans gaining access to Venezuela’s oil reserves spurred calls for official American 
aid to the country’s agricultural and food economy. Among the most prominent 
supporters of such an exercise in American economic diplomacy was businessman 
Nelson A. Rockefeller, who had become enamored with Venezuela in the 1930s and 
whose family held extensive interests in petroleum companies operating there, including 
Creole Petroleum. In 1941, Rockefeller convinced President Franklin D. Roosevelt to 
appoint him head of a new agency tasked with using Yankee dollars to bolster South 
American economies and counter German propaganda. By 1942, the Office of the 
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs had a budget of $38 million. Its agricultural, 
technical assistance, and cultural programs established a template for Cold War-era 
anticommunist development programs, especially President Truman’s “Point Four” 
program.4 
By the end of the war Venezuela’s economy was deeply dependent on petroleum 
exports to the United States as well as imports of American food and agricultural aid. 
Leftist demands for the removal of U.S. capitalist influence in the country increased 
during the war, particularly after the 1941 formation of the social democratic political 
party Acción Democrática led by former communist Rómulo Betancourt. In October 
1945, Acción Democrática successfully overthrew the regime of López Contreras’s 
wartime successor Isaías Medina Angarita, putting Betancourt into the presidency. 
Betancourt’s vision for the future of Venezuela was of an urbanizing, industrializing 
nation where workers’ rights were respected and middle-class consumers benefited 


































































capitalists from the country’s economy or political processes. To aid the transformation, 
Acción Democrática worked to redirect more of the profits from oil extraction to the 
Venezuelan state while also instituting agrarian reforms in an effort to diversify the 
economy. Yet postwar food shortages and price spikes, a product of the country’s heavy 
reliance on imported food and lack of agricultural productivity, bedevilled the Acción 
Democrática regime. Betancourt increasingly courted international support, seeking to 
mechanize and industrialize the country’s agriculture and drive down food prices.5  
Nelson Rockefeller was among those internationalists who proved most 
receptive to Betancourt’s call for investment in Venezuelan agrifood systems. Despite 
his concern that Acción Democrática was on a path to nationalizing its oil industry (as 
Mexico had done in 1938), Rockefeller entered extensive negotiations in early 1947 
with Betancourt’s administration, labor leaders, and foreign oil company executives to 
devise a plan for bolstering the Venezuelan food economy. The result was the creation 
of the Venezuelan Basic Economy Corporation (VBEC). The firm’s mission was 
relatively straightforward: it would invest in new enterprises devoted to lowering the 
price of food, primarily by “improving methods of food distribution” and boosting 
agricultural production.6 
Despite the seemingly simple mission, VBEC’s complex corporate governance 
structure reflected the convoluted politics that shaped its formation and the expectations 
of what the firm could deliver. VBEC was formed as a subsidiary of Rockefeller’s New 
York-based International Basic Economy Corporation (IBEC), also established in 1947. 
IBEC was incorporated with a grander mission of proving to the world that U.S.-based 
technical expertise, joined with Yankee capital, could generate substantial profits from 
investing in the basic welfare of developing nations. In other words, IBEC was a for-


































































American Affairs, and was explicitly framed as an exercise in Cold War anticommunist 
propaganda. VBEC was thus owned and controlled by a U.S. parent firm that demanded 
both profits and demonstrable political results from its operations. Yet negotiations with 
the Betancourt administration led to an agreement that the Venezuelan government, 
operating through its own wholly owned subsidiary—the Corporación Venezolana de 
Fomento —would subscribe to 50 percent of each VBEC subsidiary’s capitalization via 
non-voting preferred stock. Foreign oil companies operating in Venezuela contributed 
the other 50 percent of capitalization for the enterprise, likewise receiving non-voting 
preferred stock. Control and management of the VBEC subsidiaries thus remained 
firmly in the hands of Rockefeller interests, though ownership was shared in a 
complicated arrangement involving both foreign and domestic stakeholders. Rockefeller 
promised that after a period of ten years, foreign investors would begin retiring the 
preferred stock, opening up investment opportunities to Venezuelan citizens and thereby 
shifting substantial control and ownership of the entire enterprise into domestic, private 
hands.7  
Thus VBEC was in some ways ahead of its time, an early example of what 
would later be called “hybrid organizations” that simultaneously pursue financial 
sustainability and social investment.8 Yet VBEC was very much a product of its own 
time and place, as its complicated hybrid form was largely due to the fact that it was 
meant to serve multiple, potentially conflicting, interests both inside and outside of 
Venezuela. Both Betancourt and Rockefeller agreed on the fundamental premise that 
widespread benefits could be gained if Venezuela’s oil wealth were used to build a 
more diversified economy. The price and availability of food in postwar Venezuela was 
of particular concern for unionized industrial workers and middle-class urban 


































































For Betancourt, state investment in the nation’s food infrastructure would 
simultaneously demonstrate Acción Democrática’s commitment to its mission and 
prevent foreign capitalists from monopolizing economic power as they had done in 
petroleum since the Gómez regime. Meanwhile Rockefeller, who was increasingly 
harboring political ambitions of his own, envisioned VBEC as a model for 
demonstrating to the socialist world the power of American free enterprise as an engine 
for distributing wealth. It was thus crucial from Rockefeller’s perspective, as well as 
from foreign oil company executives’ viewpoints, that VBEC be understood as a form 
of “free enterprise,” a bulwark both against communist ideology and socialist threats of 
nationalizing industries such as petroleum. Even if the government provided half of the 
initial capital for VBEC, its direct control over operations had to remain limited, as did 
its regulatory interventions in the food industry. For Betancourt, a fairer food 
infrastructure would satisfy the Venezuelan masses and support a stable democracy. For 
American investors, this was also the goal, but with the important proviso that 
“democracy” not include a substantial voice for communists. Finally, for all concerned 
it was important that VBEC not appear to be a predatory business driving local 
enterprises out of the market, but instead offering a model for Venezuelan-based private 
interests to emulate in an effort to diversify the country’s economy.9 
It was a heady mix of goals, a swirl of contradictory visions of what “free 
enterprise” might look like in the Venezuelan food economy. Over several decades of 
operation, the vision behind VBEC took several different concrete forms, including the 
construction of a remarkably profitable chain of supermarkets, the establishment of 
several model farms, and a fish processing business.10 A closer look at one of VBEC’s 


































































complicated the politics of food distribution could get in a business intended to produce 
both sustainable profits and broader social progress. 
INLACA 
Milk for the Masses 
Prior to the 1940s, the Venezuelan dairy industry could barely be considered an industry 
at all. As in many countries in Europe and Latin America, consumption of fresh milk 
was extremely stratified by economic class and geography. Fresh milk was not really 
for the masses, but instead for concentrated pockets of middle- and upper-class 
urbanites. Daily fluid milk consumption in the capital Caracas was estimated in the 
1930s at 18 liters per year per person, essentially the amount needed for affluent 
residents to enjoy the liquid stimulant café con leche. (By comparison, annual fresh 
milk consumption in 1930 London was 139 liters per year, and in Zurich 230 liters per 
year).11 
Venezuela’s first—and for several decades, only—milk processing plant 
equipped with modern technology was built in 1915. It was owned by the dictator Juan 
Vicente Gómez, who treated the business much like his other enterprises, using the reins 
of the state to ensure monopoly power and distributing the firm’s profits to cronies who 
in turn assured Gómez’s political power. The plant distributed packaged butter and 
some cheese, primarily to affluent consumers in Caracas. After 1937, during the López 
Contreras presidency, several modern pasteurization plants were built in Caracas and 
Valencia to deliver fresh fluid milk to elite urban residents. The rest of the country, as 
well as working-class city dwellers, relied almost entirely on reconstituted milk made 
from imported dried milk powder. Cheese, in the form of queso de mano, played an 


































































on farms. Queso de mano, as the name suggests, required little in the way of capital 
investment or technological sophistication for either production or distribution. One 
Rockefeller associate described such cheese in 1943 as “of questionable qualities” and 
suggested that the ample milk supplies of the sparsely populated Maracaibo Basin, if 
only they could instead be transported to larger cities in fluid milk form, would “effect a 
salutary change.”12 
In 1946 Acción Democrática began a push to transform the dairy economy of 
Venezuela. The goal was to improve the quality and availability of fluid milk without 
increasing retail prices. Making milk available to the masses, and not solely to what 
Romulo Betancourt often called the “élite caraqueña” (Caracas elite), was very much in 
line with the populist-consumerist politics of the Acción Democrática regime. Indeed, 
prior to coming to power Betancourt had criticized the military leaders of the Gomecista 
era for allowing a “milk deficit” that prevented workers and peasants from being able to 
afford nutritious milk for their children. Once in power, Betancourt authorized the 
Corporación Venezolana de Fomento to purchase two existing pasteurizing plants in 
Caracas, merging them into a single state-owned company, SILSA (Sindicato de la 
Leche, S.A.). The firm focused on reconstituted milk, selling at half the price of fresh 
milk.13 
During Nelson Rockefeller’s visits with Betancourt in 1947, he was shown 
SILSA’s operations. Caracas residents waited in long lines to purchase the low-price 
reconstituted milk from what was commonly referred to as a “mechanical cow.” Acción 
Democrática representatives asked Rockefeller to “give serious consideration” to 
“taking the leadership” in constructing similar milk processing facilities in other major 
cities, including Maracaibo, Valencia, Barquisimeto, San Cristobal, and Barcelona. 


































































headquarters in New York in May 1947, VBEC representatives began purchasing 
equipment and designing a model processing plant.14  
There was, however, a crucial problem with the “mechanical cow.” Although 
half-price reconstituted government milk had obvious price advantages for working-
class consumers, it was beset by inherent questions of trust and legitimacy. Most 
problematic were rumors suggesting that SILSA’s milk was so cheap because it was 
adulterated with lime and chalk. The rumors, though false, highlight how the 
distribution of food, particularly highly perishable food such as fluid milk, generally 
involves a complicated balancing act between legitimacy, trust, and price.15  
An organization, whether public or private, that can provide wider, more 
affordable, or more certain access to food can gain or enhance its institutional 
legitimacy. Failure to do so, as the literature on the moral economy of food has 
repeatedly shown, can lead to mass rejection of the legitimacy of entire classes of 
organization—e.g., “middlemen,” grain speculators, chain stores, local and national 
governments.16 The ability of consumers to trust an organization that distributes food is 
of course shaped by general attitudes of legitimacy, but also by the extent to which 
asymmetries of information between producers and consumers are either lessened or 
increased as food moves through the chain of distribution. Trust is severely undermined 
during food scares and crises involving pathogens such as E. coli and salmonella, or in 
the case of milk, tuberculosis bacteria. Public and private organizations spent much of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries devising institutional means of ensuring trust in 
perishable foods—with mixed results—including the rise of branded packages, the 
development of inspection and certification regimes, and the deployment of 


































































Making milk cheaper, then, was simply not enough for Acción Democrática. 
Given Venezuela’s recent political history of corruption and dictatorship, in many ways 
it was more important for the social democratic government to use milk distribution as a 
means of securing trust and legitimacy than as a program in reducing the price of food. 
The politics of food became even more central to Acción Democrática’s fortunes in 
February 1948, when Rómulo Gallegos took office after having won a landslide victory 
in what is considered the first legitimately democratic election in Venezuelan history. 
On the eve of his presidency, Gallegos pledged to “raise the standard of living of 
Venezuelans, both in cities and on the farms,” making it clear that agricultural 
productivity and lower food prices were high priorities.18 Relying on a combination of 
“mechanical cows” and foreign capitalists whose fortunes had been made in part from 
exploiting Venezuela’s petroleum resources was perhaps not the most politically 
palatable route to take. This helps explain why, in March 1948, representatives of the 
Gallegos government surprised the Rockefeller team by declaring they “did not want to 
participate in any manner in the milk company, and would prefer that VBEC abandon 
the project.” But with more than $300,000 already invested, VBEC’s managers were not 
inclined to give up so easily.19 
A series of negotiations led to an agreement in mid-1948: VBEC would move 
away from reconstituted milk and instead work with the Gallegos government to 
pioneer a fresh fluid milk industry. Inherently this would require some means of 
boosting local production of fresh milk, rather than relying on imports of powdered 
milk from the United States. It would require efficient transportation of Venezuelan 
milk from farms to pasteurization plants. And it would require the construction of a 
distribution system for customers who were largely unaccustomed to drinking milk that 


































































the preceding decades in the United States, regional and national battles over the 
production and distribution of milk had led to so many vitriolic and event violent 
episodes—including milk strikes and milk boycotts—that in 1943 a U.S. federal judge 
suggested milk had nearly been the cause of an “incipient agrarian revolution” in the 
1930s and that over the recent course of American history milk had “provok[ed] as 
much human strife and nastiness as strong alcoholic beverages.” In the U.S., the 
response to this milk problem in the 1930s entailed a complicated political 
infrastructure of regional milk marketing orders, antitrust enforcement, agreements with 
labor unions, and technological developments in trucking. Even with this thick web of 
regulatory intervention, in many ways the acrimony over the politics of milk 
distribution continued to rankle U.S. consumers, workers, business managers, and 
policymakers well into the 1950s.21 
The Gallegos government did not follow the American approach of deep 
regulatory intervention into the dairy economy. Instead the initial focus was on direct 
subsidies. To entice Venezuelan farmers to produce more high-quality milk and wean 
the nation off imported powder, the Gallegos government instituted a base payment for 
dairy farmers, to be paid through milk bottling plants.22 This was in part a response to 
the distinctive environment and geography of Venezuelan agriculture. Raising dairy 
cattle in any climate is subject to constraints of seasonality, as cows always produce 
significantly more milk when they are able to dine on juicy grasses, but in a tropical 
climate with widely varying cycles of rainy and dry seasons the problem is exacerbated. 
Generally rain benefits pastures for cattle grazing, but too much rain makes them 
unusable, while prolonged dry periods severely restrict milk production. Most of the 
cattle raised in Venezuela were crossbreeds well adapted to the extremes of the tropical 


































































Brown Swiss cattle, but adaptation to tropical conditions did not make the cattle 
especially well-suited to year-round mass production of milk. A subsidy to dairy 
farmers, then, was expected to provide incentives to farmers to specialize in milk 
production, investing in dairy herds bred specifically to produce milk as well as 
enabling the purchase of concentrated feedstuff additives to boost production in off-
seasons. Rockefeller’s team at VBEC agreed to support the initiative by building a 
model dairy farm at Chirgua, about 150km west of Caracas on an abandoned coffee 
estate in the state of Carabobo. The managers of the dairy farm would provide technical 
advice to Venezuelan farmers, encouraging them to adopt American dairy science and 
technology.23 
 In autumn 1948 there was reason for optimism both among Acción Democrática 
supporters and the managers of VBEC. Rockefeller’s team was busy building model 
farms and designing model dairy plants, intent upon demonstrating the power of 
American capital to deliver fresh milk to the masses. But what was already a 
complicated political situation became only more so in November 1948, when military 
officer Marcos Pérez Jiménez orchestrated a successful coup against the Gallegos 
government, establishing a new dictatorship that would last a decade.  
Legitimacy, Trust, and Competition 
Pérez Jiménez initially took power through force, but maintained power through 
spectacles of consumer plenty. With world oil prices steadily rising in the 1950s, the 
military regime invested heavily in public infrastructure, visibly proclaiming 
Venezuela’s importance on the world stage through concrete testaments to modernist 
progress, from bridges to museums to stadiums. Pérez Jiménez staked his regime’s 
claim to legitimacy on the ability to efficiently deliver the material goods of mid-


































































their ideology than for their ineptitude.24 Thus, a sweeping (and notoriously repressive) 
transformation of political leadership did not necessarily dictate a fundamental 
transformation of the VBEC milk project. Delivering affordable milk to the masses, 
previously a project in social democracy, remained an important goal under the military 
dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez. 
The demise of Acción Democrática and the rise of a military dictatorship reliant 
on harmonious relations with foreign-owned petroleum companies meant that initially 
VBEC’s operations were left largely alone by the new government. In early 1949 
VBEC negotiated a deal with a group of Venezuelan businessmen to purchase their 
assets in an outdated milk processing plant in Valencia in exchange for a minority share 
in a new VBEC subsidiary, Industria Láctea de Carabobo (INLACA), a joint venture 
with U.S.-based Golden State Dairies. Rockefeller’s team took on substantial debt to 
update the plant’s technology. By the end of its first full year of operation INLACA 
could report numerous successes. In October 1949 the firm received its first license to 
distribute fresh milk in the Caracas area as well as Valencia, and was quickly selling its 
“entire supply” of upwards of 13,000 liters of milk per day. Some 1,200 liters of that 
supply had recently been procured from the “El Manglar” hacienda, a grade A milk 
producer equipped with modern refrigeration technology and “one of the finest 
operations in Venezuela” according to INLACA’s first manager, E. G. Van Wagner, 
formerly of Golden State Dairies.25  
Sales successes for INLACA continued to mount in 1950 and 1951. In the first 
three months of 1950, the firm earned double its expected income. By the end of the 
year the firm declared a net income of $112,227, on sales of over 5.7 million quarts of 
pasteurized milk and more than 67,000 quarts of ice cream. Salesmen assigned to 


































































encouraging additional milk consumption, including offering deals on cheese and ice 
cream. By 1951, Edward Kimball, a former food procurement officer for the City of 
New York, had replaced Van Wagner as manager of INLACA. Kimball proudly 
reported on the success of INLACA in proving that private enterprise could provide 
incentives to dairy farmers to produce more milk, noting that INLACA offered a 
guaranteed year-round market at reliable prices. By the end of 1951, twice as many 
suppliers (70) were delivering raw milk to the firm than had done so in 1949; some 
suppliers were shipping milk as far as 250 kilometers via refrigerated truck to Valencia. 
INLACA’s milk travelled to consumers in “modern hygienic paper” cartons, rather than 
glass bottles, delivered to more than 10,000 homes daily via its house-to-house sales 
network. Sales were, as Kimball succinctly noted, “most satisfactory,” leading to a tidy 
net profit in 1951 of $207,500.26 
While INLACA was busily demonstrating the efficiency of its privately owned 
operations, its main competitor remained the state-owned SILSA. As with any food 
distribution business, competition was waged on two fronts, in both the consumer 
market and the supplier market. Consumers sought reliable, trustworthy food at the 
lowest possible price; suppliers sought reliable, trustworthy payments at the highest 
possible price. For milk processors the balancing act between the interests of producers 
and consumers was even more complicated than in many lines of the food industry, as 
the intense seasonality of milk production—which in Venezuela was (and is) 
particularly pronounced due to the tropical climate—meant that an equilibrium between 
supply and demand was hard to come by and was always intensely politicized. In the 
United States, as noted earlier, this unavoidable conflict over a “fair price” for milk led 
to the development of an elaborate regulatory regime meant to maintain systems of 


































































existed. Partly as a consequence, INLACA and SILSA experimented with a variety of 
competitive tactics to build their customer and supplier bases. In 1951, for example, 
INLACA sold quarts of home-delivered milk in Caracas for 1.25 bolivars; SILSA sold 
its quarts for only Bs. 1, as its customers resided primarily in the less affluent sections 
of the city, while INLACA dominated sales in middle-class areas. The following year, 
SILSA increased its payments to farmers by 5 centimos per liter, threatening to poach 
some of INLACA’s most reliable producers. In response, manager Edward Kimball 
informed the board of directors that he refused to let INLACA become a “national 
parasite” like SILSA and would demand a hearing with the Minister of Fomento.27 
For his part the Minister of Fomento had, according to Venezuelan newspapers, 
become “acquainted with the big profits being made by both producers and pasteurizing 
companies.” The primary profiteer, it was reported, was INLACA. Government 
officials began devising plans to intervene much more heavily in the burgeoning dairy 
industry, potentially introducing some American-style regulatory functions such as 
pricing systems based on a combination of geographical region, milk quality, and 
whether consumers’ milk was store-bought or home-delivered. In early 1952 the 
government formalized a new approach, setting a maximum retail price for milk with 
the intent of enabling Venezuelan milk distributors who had previously been undersold 
by INLACA to compete on price, even without home delivery. Ironically, Edward 
Kimball’s response to the state’s price ceiling was to request permission from the board 
of directors to dramatically expand sales, buying raw milk increasingly from farms near 
Maracaibo, 700km west of Caracas. At the end of 1952, INLACA reported a 69% 
increase in production over the previous year, and although the year was profitable, the 


































































Thus as of 1954 INLACA was clearly supporting the mission of its parent 
VBEC, churning out reliable profits by selling affordable milk, setting an example for 
domestic firms to emulate. But several of VBEC’s other subsidiaries, particularly its 
farming operations, had performed exceptionally poorly. Consequently, in 1954 VBEC 
was liquidated, with all assets merged into New York-based IBEC. All shares in the 
firm previously owned by the Venezuelan government and by foreign oil companies 
were acquired by IBEC, leaving control and ownership over INLACA firmly in the 
hands of a New York-based corporation strongly associated with Nelson A. Rockefeller. 
With the full support of IBEC’s directors, INLACA continued to rapidly expand its 
operations in Venezuela. Confident of its buyer power, the firm began insisting that all 
120 of its producers install refrigerated bulk tanks on their farms, an expensive 
investment in the milk supply chain that effectively signalled to farmers they either 
needed to boost their production or exit the market. INLACA’s milk was distributed in 
40 towns and cities, reaching beyond the federal district of Caracas into eight other 
states in the capital, central, central-western, and llanos regions. Sales of Bs. 22 million 
produced substantial profits of Bs 898,000 in 1954.29 
The politics of INLACA’s business took on new layers of complexity after the 
merger into IBEC, imbuing competition in the milk marketplace with new questions of 
legitimacy. As one IBEC representative familiar with Venezuelan politics noted, the 
company was “considered foreign” and faced a significant challenge rooted in the 
agrarian infrastructure laid in the Gomecista era, as “the large dairy farms are the 
property of strong capitalists, who directly or indirectly, have a positive voice in the 
government.” Such producers might very well comply with demands to industrialize 
their operations with the instalment of bulk tanks (thus erecting barriers to entry for 


































































SILSA to pressure the American-owned firm to increase its prices for raw milk. Or, as 
INLACA managers increasingly worried in 1955, well-capitalized dairy farmers could 
themselves become competitors; as one report put it, “Everyone in Venezuela who owns 
a cow thinks he should have a milk plant.” Groups of around a dozen milk producers 
were increasingly forming joint stock companies to establish their own pasteurization 
plants, generally delivering direct to retail food stores and restaurants rather than bother 
with home delivery service. With more entrants to the milk distribution business 
competing with INLACA and SILSA, but with all distributors limited by law to 
maximum consumer prices of Bs. 1 per liter, INLACA increasingly turned to price wars 
to maintain its market share. In 1955 the company sold at a loss in its largest market of 
Caracas in 1955, although nationwide sales that year reached Bs. 24.6 million, with 
profits of Bs. 691,100.30  
The competition became intense enough by 1956 that IBEC’s directors believed 
a crossroads had been reached: either INLACA should be sold outright, or it should 
redouble its energies and strongly assert its dominance in both the supply chain and in 
retail markets. INLACA was one of IBEC’s most consistently profitable divisions (its 
Venezuelan supermarkets the other), so the decision was nearly foreordained. First 
INLACA demanded that politically connected dairy farmers accept lower prices, even 
for milk cooled on the farm in bulk tanks, otherwise the firm would liquidate its assets 
and cease operations. Once the producers fell in line, INLACA opened a new front in 
the retail price war, introducing “7 Lochas” brand homogenized milk. Selling 
homogenized pasteurized milk was an innovation for the Venezulean market, as was the 
idea of making a brand mark out of a specific retail price—locha being the colloquial 
term for a 1/8th bolivar coin worth 12.5 centimos, thus 7 Lochas sold for 87.5 centimos. 


































































competitors to slash their own prices, though he acknowledged that “tak[ing] the 
offensive in order to protect its market” would drive the firm’s accounts into the red for 
the short term. Still, Kimball remained confident that the plan would not set off political 
retribution as it would require INLACA to source more of its milk from the western 
state of Zulia, a land of productive pastures which government officials had openly 
declared ought to “be the ‘Wisconsin’ of Venezuela,” mass-producing “cheaper milk” 
for the central and capital districts.31 
Nearly a decade into its operations, INLACA had established its legitimacy as a 
large-scale private enterprise despite being foreign-owned and repeatedly antagonizing 
both its competitors and its suppliers. INLACA’s managers had forged relationships of 
trust with thousands of Venezuelan consumers, who had integrated pasteurized fluid 
milk into their diets to such an extent that Edward Kimball predicted 1957 sales of Bs. 
1.2 million and suggested offering shareholders an “extra dividend” despite the impacts 
of ongoing price wars. And the firm was clearly meeting its intended mission as a spur 
to competition, using its concentrated economic power to push both its distributing 
competitors and its farm suppliers to seek efficiencies in production and economies of 
scale and scope as they ramped up the dairy industry in Venezuela. Over the course of 
1948-1958, when the Venezuelan population grew by three percent annually, milk 
consumption increased by ten percent, so that overall consumption doubled within a 
decade.32 
Then, in January 1958, a coup d’etat ended the Pérez Jiménez regime amidst 
rising dissatisfaction with the dictator’s claims to legitimacy, spurred on by his 1957 
decision to cancel a promised election that he realized he would not win. In the wake of 
the revolution, after a short period of caretaker governance by a military junta, elections 


































































Revolution, Reform, and Retreat 
Initial reaction to the coup was quite upbeat among Rockefeller associates on the 
ground in Venezuela. As one IBEC manager put it, “we have many friends in the new 
government” and the prospects of “returning to a democratic and representative form of 
government” seemed promising for the milk business. Yet events of September 
highlighted the instability of INLACA’s political position, when yet another military 
rebellion, though quickly quashed by government troops, disrupted the movement of 
milk nationwide for several days. In response, a critical friend of INLACA suggested 
the firm ought to “do something more than it has done in the past in the way of building 
up good will, or let us call it public relations.” Raking in profits and spurring ever-more 
intense competition in the dairy industry was not enough; the firm needed to cooperate 
with the new leaders of the country to rebuild the public’s trust, not just in the quality of 
its milk but also in the entire political economy of food distribution.33 
Thus in early 1959, as Romulo Betancourt officially retook office as the nation’s 
president, INLACA also changed its leadership, with Bernardo Jofre replacing Edward 
Kimball as the firm’s general manager. Unlike Kimball, Spanish-born Jofre had a knack 
for understanding the nuances of Latin American politics, having made his professional 
name as a writer of political editorials in Caracas before serving as Rockefeller’s Head 
of Public Relations for the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs during 
World War II. Although IBEC’s directors put their faith in Jofre to navigate INLACA 
through Venezuela’s new political territory, they also reduced their financial stake in the 
firm, selling half of the company’s shares to Foremost Dairies, the U.S.’s fourth-largest 



































































Jofre’s first opportunity for burnishing INLACA’s political reputation came in 
March 1959 when the firm was contracted by the Betancourt government to deliver 
fresh milk to every school student in Caracas. Jofre had his “fingers crossed” for the 
success of the program, recognizing it not only as a good political move but also as “a 
free sales promotion for fresh milk.” The firm’s significance in Venezuela’s domestic 
economy was substantial, accounting for 37% of fluid milk sales in the country, with 
the majority of its supplies now coming from the western state of Zulia surrounding the 
shores of Lake Maracaibo. Yet there remained significant opportunity for growth, as 
Venezuelan per capita dairy consumption, despite having doubled in the previous 
decade, remained at half that of the United States. Furthermore, the country continued 
to rely heavily on imported dry whole milk for reconstitution, undercutting markets for 
domestic dairy farmers and undermining incentives for increased specialization in 
dairying, even in Zulia, the would-be “Wisconsin” of Venezuela.35 
Indeed it was in the area of farms and farm politics that one of the most striking 
contrasts between Venezuela’s dairy economy and that of the United States became 
increasingly apparent. The original plan behind VBEC, with the backing of Acción 
Democrática, had been to use food distribution enterprises—not only milk, but also 
supermarkets—to spearhead an agro-industrial transformation of the countryside, 
spurring rural development in an effort to wean the country off food imports. The 
impact of INLACA on dairy farming illuminates the mixed results of this project. On 
the one hand, INLACA had provided market incentives to some Venezuelan cattle 
farmers to specialize in and boost production of fresh milk. Yet those incentives 
primarily appealed to large landowners already well capitalized. As a result, the 
fundamental structure of the rural dairy economy remained largely unchanged, certainly 


































































farm economy were almost wholly a product of private market incentives, with 
remarkably little government involvement in either the infrastructure of the rural 
economy or the regulation of wholesale or retail markets, other than the provision of a 
base subsidy to dairy producers which primarily benefited large landowners. In the late-
1950s United States, farmers large and small relied on a dense infrastructure in which 
state research universities, federal scientists and policymakers, state-federal cooperative 
extension agents, and large-scale agribusinesses ensured that farmers were always 
aware of the latest scientific and technological developments that could boost 
production. American farmers who failed to hop onto what Minnesota farm economist 
Willard Cochrane labeled a “technological treadmill” in 1958, e.g. by investing in a 
bulk milk tank or converting to an all-Holstein dairy herd to increase output, could 
expect to have their operations bought out by those farmers who did. In Venezuela, by 
contrast, the federal government invested very little in the infrastructure of agribusiness. 
There were no agricultural market reports—except for milk price reports delivered a full 
year after the information would have been relevant to producers—no livestock 
reporting, no federally maintained grades or standards for farm products or processed 
foods, no federal inspection service, and very little technical advice provided to farmers. 
Thus, although producing and distributing milk was an intensely political enterprise in 
Venezuela, the political questions tended to focus on the end consumer with relatively 
little attention paid to the food system as a whole. Farm politics, in other words, had 
been left to private businesses in the distribution end of the food chain to hammer out. 
Strategy was forged in the halls of government, but operations were managed almost 
entirely by private businesses.36  
It was not the case, however, that the new Betancourt administration had no 


































































spring 1959, Jofre informed IBEC directors of his concern that Betancourt might hold 
the company to its original agreement to have Venezuelans take over ownership of the 
firm after ten years, even though VBEC had been liquidated. Over the next several 
years, IBEC responded to such pressure by selling off its non-voting shares, so that by 
1963 Venezuelan investors held a 47.9% stake in the firm, although IBEC maintained 
its controlling stock. INLACA found more difficulty in its ongoing attempts to negotiate 
better terms with its milk suppliers. A September 1961 attempt to reduce the prices paid 
to farmers led the Ministry of Agriculture to announce that “any attempt to arbitrarily 
reduce the price of milk [would] be counteracted by application of a special clause of 
the Agrarian Law [of 1960].” This legislation called for an immediate transformation of 
the country’s farm economy, a transition to full agricultural self-sufficiency. The 
agrarian reform act included provisions for land redistribution, resettlement of 
subsistence farmers, offers of credit to small farmers, government investment in 
marketing facilities, guaranteed farm prices, and improved rural housing for 
farmworkers. Much of the political attention to the 1960 Agrarian Law, at the time and 
for years afterward, focused on the promise (ultimately undelivered) to redistribute land 
to small-scale producers. Yet the government’s reaction to INLACA’s attempted price 
cut illustrated the day-to-day reality that power in the countryside remained firmly in 
the hand of large, well-capitalized producers who maintained strong influence in the 
ministry of agriculture.37  
In 1965 the Acción Democrática government introduced a dramatic revision to 
dairy policy, attempting to reinforce the aims of the 1960 Agrarian Law by making 
Venezuela self-sufficient in milk production. Consumer prices for both fluid milk and 
milk powder were adjusted to the level of domestic production costs. In part the new 


































































production increased 145 percent, from 444.6 million liters to 646.1 million. The intent 
behind increased consumer prices was to provide incentives to Venezuelan farmers to 
meet domestic demand for milk, driving foreign imported milk out of the market 
entirely. Prices for reconstituted milk—still primarily consumed by low-income 
citizens—suddenly rose around 30 percent, while pasteurized fluid milk prices 
increased by 12.5 percent. As a result, per capita consumption of milk fell quickly back 
to mid-1950s levels. The directors of IBEC began considering full divestment of their 
milk business in Venezuela, noting that INLACA was “placed squarely between the 
consumers and the farmers, and is subject to all nature of political and economic forces, 
generally acting contrary to Inlaca’s interests.” Such discussions continued for several 
years at IBEC headquarters. Continued profitability of the milk business made IBEC’s 
directors loath to pull out; indeed in 1968 the company declared expansion of INLACA 
to be a “priority.” But when Edward Kimball returned as head of INLACA in 1971, he 
was struck by rising hostility against U.S.-owned companies operating in Venezuela and 
began pressuring New York to sell its remaining shares in the firm. Full divestiture 
ultimately came in 1974, with ownership of the firm shifting to a group of Venezuelan 
cattle dealers who renamed the firm C. A. Industries Lara-Carabobo.38  
Five years before IBEC pulled out of the milk distribution business in 
Venezuela, an American economist produced a report on the country’s farm and food 
economy for the Ford Foundation. Surveying the nation’s food distribution system as a 
whole, Louis E. Heaton saw it “characterized by few strong points and many weak 
ones.” Among the strong points was the distribution of milk, anchored by 19 large 
pasteurization plants and five powdered milk plants. But Heaton upheld the consensus 
view that rural producers, supported by government subsidies, had not really invested in 


































































constant crisis with respect to policies to be followed, and widely differing arguments 
are presented by the various interests involved.” The one thing everyone could agree on 
was that conflicts over the place and price of milk in Venezuela’s economy were 
unlikely to end anytime soon.39  
Conclusion 
For just over a quarter of a century, American capitalists owned and operated a milk 
distribution firm in Venezuela, delivering milk through multiple political revolutions 
and constantly beset by “widely differing arguments” as to the purpose of the company. 
At first called upon to deliver milk to the masses as a developmental project in state-
backed social democracy, the firm proved most successful in the 1950s as a for-profit 
firm devoted primarily to buying milk from affluent farmers to process into pasteurized 
milk for upper-income consumers. Contestation over whether the firm should be a 
Venezuelan-owned company or an American-funded model of capitalist efficiency 
reflected the deeply politicized position of the firm. As a food distribution business, 
INLACA was inherently caught in the middle of competing demands from producers 
and consumers, a fraught position in any context that was further amplified by the fact 
that multiple political regimes in the country saw the distribution of milk as a significant 
aspect of their claims to legitimacy. It is remarkable that the company was as successful 
as it was at delivering the goods, though it is also worth noting how fundamentally the 
enterprise failed to deliver the transformative political results expected of it at its 
founding. 
At core the history of INLACA highlights the importance of food sovereignty to 
Venezuela’s twentieth-century political dynamics. The term “food sovereignty” only 
came into formal usage in the early 1980s, emerging from a Mexican government 


































































measured national “self-sufficiency” in food to an approach of “national control over 
diverse aspects of the food chain, thus reducing foreign capital and imports of basic 
foods, inputs and technology.”40 For petroleum-rich, exceptionally urbanized Venezuela 
at mid-century, “self-sufficiency” in quantitative terms—whether calories, liters, or 
bushels—was by any objective measure a misplaced goal. Rationally it made sense to 
export valuable oil and import cheap food. But notions of sovereignty—of national 
pride, of government authority and legitimacy, of localized control over the meanings 
and structures and enterprises of food provisioning—challenged such quantitative, 
rational measures. Thus in the Agrarian Law of 1960, Venezuela declared a goal of 
“self-sufficiency,” but the specifics of the program were focused on redistributing 
economic and social power—sovereignty—by broadening access to land and markets 
and healthful foods throughout the agrifood system. The long-term failure of the 
reforms to achieve either quantitative self-sufficiency or substantive qualitative 
transformations in the agrifood economy, however, illustrate an essential tension 
embedded in food sovereignty: achieving redistribution of power in the agrifood system 
inherently requires significance exercise of state authority, yet by redistributing such 
power the state opens itself up to threats, including questions regarding the legitimacy 
of the government in power.41 The history of INLACA clearly illustrates such tensions, 
as over the course of 27 years it was at times called upon to bolster the legitimacy of 
state interventions in the food economy and at other times shunned as a threat to 
Venezuelan national identity and self-sufficiency.  
In the twenty years following IBEC’s decision to pull out of the Venezuelan 
milk business, the project of agrarian transformation continued to face significant 
challenges. From 1984 to 1988, an Acción Democrática regime led by Jaime Lusinchi 


































































output and food self-sufficiency, again primarily through provision of subsidies and 
credit to producers rather than through investment in the infrastructure of agricultural 
production or distribution. But continued dependence on oil exports at a time of great 
instability in oil markets led to an economic crisis, to which the next Acción 
Democrática president, Carlos Andrés Pérez, responded by instituting a number of harsh 
neoliberal economic reforms in 1989, including slashing of farm subsidies. One 
immediate consequence was a steep decline in milk production, so that between 1989 
and 1992 the amount of milk available per capita decreased by 45 percent. Dairying 
remained a labor-intensive rural enterprise in an exceptionally urbanized country. In the 
early 1990s, more than an hour and a half of labor was required to produce a liter of 
pasteurized milk in Venezuela, when the same took four minutes in the United States.42  
One significant impetus behind the 1990s revolt against Acción Democrática 
that ultimately led to the 1998 election of Hugo Chávez was the widespread perception 
of Acción Democrática’s repeated failures to achieve its promises of national food 
sovereignty. Agrarian reform measures, including mass redistribution of land to peasant 
and tenant farmers, have been among the most far-reaching components of Chávez’s 
Bolivarian Revolution. Yet Chávez and his successor Nicolás Maduro faced many of 
the same challenges as their predecessors, including the continued political and 
economic dominance of large-scale rural landowners, as well as an ongoing lack of state 
capacity to implement and operationalize meaningful reforms on the ground to achieve 
food self-sufficiency.43 Venezuela has thus remained highly dependent on imports to 
meet its food needs. And in the contemporary milk economy, it also relies on foreign 
multinational enterprises to distribute milk: the remains of INLACA, though sold to 
Venezuelan investors in 1974, now belong to Dairy Partners Americas, a joint venture 


































































milk distribution enterprise can maintain legitimacy and trust in a political climate 
marked by intense debates over the balance between state and business power and 
rapidly deteriorating economic conditions remains uncertain.44  
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Distributing Legitimacy: The Politics of Milk in Post-World War II 
Venezuela 
Questions of how best to feed the urban masses in an economy largely dependent 
on petroleum have permeated Venezuela’s domestic and international political 
spheres since World War II. A state-initiated project, run by American capitalists 
under the direction of Nelson Rockefeller, developed Venezuela’s milk 
distribution system into one of the country’s most important agrifood industries 
by the late 1960s. The ways in which the firm navigated complicated questions of 
legitimacy and trust in public and private organizations provide an illustrative 
example of the inherently complicated relationship between state and business in 
the political economy of food distribution.  
Keywords: Venezuela; milk distribution; dairy; legitimacy 
Introduction 
Food distribution in Venezuela is notoriously problematic. For a decade and a half, 
American and British newspapers have episodically drawn international attention to 
interminable queues and empty shelves at Venezuelan supermarkets. Such reporting 
generally lays the blame for food shortages and repeated bouts of hyperinflation on the 
socialist economic policies of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro. For right-wing 
propagandists, the ready availability of photographs of Venezuela’s failures in food 
distribution provides easy fodder for ridiculing socialism and declaring the inherent 
superiority of capitalism.1 
But Venezuela’s contemporary food challenges have a much longer and more 
complicated history than such reports suggest. Although that history is extraordinary, it 
helps elucidate the ways in which the distribution of food is an inescapably politicized 
form of business enterprise. Indeed, since World War II, questions of how best to feed 
the urban masses in an economy largely dependent on petroleum have permeated 
Venezuela’s domestic and international political spheres. Throughout the latter half of 
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the twentieth century, in fact, the political legitimacy of numerous regimes, ranging 
from social democratic governments to military dictatorships to revolutionary socialists, 
has been staked on promises of making Venezuela more self-sufficient and domestically 
secure in the production and distribution of food. And although contemporary 
commentators may think they are the first to suggest that Venezuela’s food problems at 
are the fault of its political leadership, one truism of Venezuelan economic history, as 
Ruth Capriles and Marisol Rodríguez de Gonzalo have noted, is “the frequency with 
which writers attribute the entire blame for the failures of economic development to the 
state.” Yet, as Capriles and Rodríguez note, “the relationship between the state and 
business or the state and the market is not one-way, or even two-way, but a multiple 
one.” This point is sharpened by recent research into Cold War communist enterprises; 
even when the state takes full responsibility for delivering goods and services and 
outlaws private business, managers must still engage in enterprise, and in doing so must 
navigate relationships far more complex than simple unidirectional command-and-
control directives from the state. In Venezuelan history—much the same as in any other 
nation, no matter the ideology of its political leadership—nothing has ever been 
particularly simple about business-government relations.2 
A state-initiated project in developing Venezuela’s milk distribution system after 
World War II provides an illustrative example of the complicated relationship between 
state and business. Prior to the arrival of the American businessmen, led by Nelson A. 
Rockefeller, who set up Industria Láctea de Carabobo (INLACA), Venezuela’s dairy 
economy was almost non-existent. By the end of the 1960s, however, dairying was 
economically more significant than the beef cattle industry—traditionally one of 
Venezuela’s most important enterprises—and INLACA was the largest and one of the 
most consistently profitable food businesses in the country. Precisely whose interests 
were served and whose political legitimacy the firm helped support, however, remained 
in constant question. Both INLACA’s successes and failures in transforming the politics 
and business of the Venezuelan milk economy, sheds light on the fraught process of 
state intervention in agrifood systems that has long bedevilled the Venezuelan political 
economy of food distribution. 
 
The Food Problem in Venezuela 
Petroleum first became a major component of the Venezuelan economy in the 1920s, 
during the presidency of Juan Vicente Gómez. Tapped primarily by North American 
and European companies granted low-cost concessions by the dictatorial Gómez 
regime, oil decisively replaced agricultural products (coffee, cacao, and cattle hides) as 
Venezuela’s primary export during the Great Depression. When Gómez seized power in 
1908, Venezuela was self-sufficient in food production. By 1950, agriculture comprised 
less than one-tenth of the country’s GDP, the lowest share in all of Latin America, and 
the populace relied on imported food. The domestic political economy of agriculture 
and food nonetheless remained central to the nation’s efforts at state-building. As 
historian Doug Yarrington has shown, the rise of Venezuela’s modern state was 
grounded in no small part in Gómez’s dictatorial control over the nation’s cattle and 
meat business. After Gómez’s death in 1935, his military successor Eleazar López 
Contreras confronted rising demands from leftists for the dismantling of Gómez’s 
infrastructure of corruption. López Contreras forestalled demands for radical change in 
part by introducing several significant reforms in agrarian policy, including the promise 
of redistribution of land to peasants. And in 1937, López Contreras developed plans to 
use increased state power to redirect petroleum profits into Venezuelan agricultural 
development.3 
By the onset of World War II, Venezuela’s economy involved an uneasy 
relationship between the international politics of oil and the domestic politics of food 
and agriculture. For U.S. petroleum firms and foreign policymakers, the possibility of 
Germans gaining access to Venezuela’s oil reserves spurred calls for official American 
aid to the country’s agricultural and food economy. Among the most prominent 
supporters of such an exercise in American economic diplomacy was businessman 
Nelson A. Rockefeller, who had become enamored with Venezuela in the 1930s and 
whose family held extensive interests in petroleum companies operating there, including 
Creole Petroleum. In 1941, Rockefeller convinced President Franklin D. Roosevelt to 
appoint him head of a new agency tasked with using Yankee dollars to bolster South 
American economies and counter German propaganda. By 1942, the Office of the 
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs had a budget of $38 million. Its agricultural, 
technical assistance, and cultural programs established a template for Cold War-era 
anticommunist development programs, especially President Truman’s “Point Four” 
program.4 
By the end of the war Venezuela’s economy was deeply dependent on petroleum 
exports to the United States as well as imports of American food and agricultural aid. 
Leftist demands for the removal of U.S. capitalist influence in the country increased 
during the war, particularly after the 1941 formation of the social democratic political 
party Acción Democrática led by former communist Rómulo Betancourt. In October 
1945, Acción Democrática successfully overthrew the regime of López Contreras’s 
wartime successor Isaías Medina Angarita, putting Betancourt into the presidency. 
Betancourt’s vision for the future of Venezuela was of an urbanizing, industrializing 
nation where workers’ rights were respected and middle-class consumers benefited 
from the nation’s resource wealth, yet without alienating landowning elites and foreign 
capitalists from the country’s economy or political processes. To aid the transformation, 
Acción Democrática worked to redirect more of the profits from oil extraction to the 
Venezuelan state while also instituting agrarian reforms in an effort to diversify the 
economy. Yet postwar food shortages and price spikes, a product of the country’s heavy 
reliance on imported food and lack of agricultural productivity, bedevilled the Acción 
Democrática regime. Betancourt increasingly courted international support, seeking to 
mechanize and industrialize the country’s agriculture and drive down food prices.5  
Nelson Rockefeller was among those internationalists who proved most 
receptive to Betancourt’s call for investment in Venezuelan agrifood systems. Despite 
his concern that Acción Democrática was on a path to nationalizing its oil industry (as 
Mexico had done in 1938), Rockefeller entered extensive negotiations in early 1947 
with Betancourt’s administration, labor leaders, and foreign oil company executives to 
devise a plan for bolstering the Venezuelan food economy. The result was the creation 
of the Venezuelan Basic Economy Corporation (VBEC). The firm’s mission was 
relatively straightforward: it would invest in new enterprises devoted to lowering the 
price of food, primarily by “improving methods of food distribution” and boosting 
agricultural production.6 
Despite the seemingly simple mission, VBEC’s complex corporate governance 
structure reflected the convoluted politics that shaped its formation and the expectations 
of what the firm could deliver. VBEC was formed as a subsidiary of Rockefeller’s New 
York-based International Basic Economy Corporation (IBEC), also established in 1947. 
IBEC was incorporated with a grander mission of proving to the world that U.S.-based 
technical expertise, joined with Yankee capital, could generate substantial profits from 
investing in the basic welfare of developing nations. In other words, IBEC was a for-
profit development agency, intentionally modelled on the wartime Office of Inter-
American Affairs, and was explicitly framed as an exercise in Cold War anticommunist 
propaganda. VBEC was thus owned and controlled by a U.S. parent firm that demanded 
both profits and demonstrable political results from its operations. Yet negotiations with 
the Betancourt administration led to an agreement that the Venezuelan government, 
operating through its own wholly owned subsidiary—the Corporación Venezolana de 
Fomento —would subscribe to 50 percent of each VBEC subsidiary’s capitalization via 
non-voting preferred stock. Foreign oil companies operating in Venezuela contributed 
the other 50 percent of capitalization for the enterprise, likewise receiving non-voting 
preferred stock. Control and management of the VBEC subsidiaries thus remained 
firmly in the hands of Rockefeller interests, though ownership was shared in a 
complicated arrangement involving both foreign and domestic stakeholders. Rockefeller 
promised that after a period of ten years, foreign investors would begin retiring the 
preferred stock, opening up investment opportunities to Venezuelan citizens and thereby 
shifting substantial control and ownership of the entire enterprise into domestic, private 
hands.7  
Thus VBEC was in some ways ahead of its time, an early example of what 
would later be called “hybrid organizations” that simultaneously pursue financial 
sustainability and social investment.8 Yet VBEC was very much a product of its own 
time and place, as its complicated hybrid form was largely due to the fact that it was 
meant to serve multiple, potentially conflicting, interests both inside and outside of 
Venezuela. Both Betancourt and Rockefeller agreed on the fundamental premise that 
widespread benefits could be gained if Venezuela’s oil wealth were used to build a 
more diversified economy. The price and availability of food in postwar Venezuela was 
of particular concern for unionized industrial workers and middle-class urban 
consumers—crucial constituents for Betancourt’s reformist Acción Democrática party. 
For Betancourt, state investment in the nation’s food infrastructure would 
simultaneously demonstrate Acción Democrática’s commitment to its mission and 
prevent foreign capitalists from monopolizing economic power as they had done in 
petroleum since the Gómez regime. Meanwhile Rockefeller, who was increasingly 
harboring political ambitions of his own, envisioned VBEC as a model for 
demonstrating to the socialist world the power of American free enterprise as an engine 
for distributing wealth. It was thus crucial from Rockefeller’s perspective, as well as 
from foreign oil company executives’ viewpoints, that VBEC be understood as a form 
of “free enterprise,” a bulwark both against communist ideology and socialist threats of 
nationalizing industries such as petroleum. Even if the government provided half of the 
initial capital for VBEC, its direct control over operations had to remain limited, as did 
its regulatory interventions in the food industry. For Betancourt, a fairer food 
infrastructure would satisfy the Venezuelan masses and support a stable democracy. For 
American investors, this was also the goal, but with the important proviso that 
“democracy” not include a substantial voice for communists. Finally, for all concerned 
it was important that VBEC not appear to be a predatory business driving local 
enterprises out of the market, but instead offering a model for Venezuelan-based private 
interests to emulate in an effort to diversify the country’s economy.9 
It was a heady mix of goals, a swirl of contradictory visions of what “free 
enterprise” might look like in the Venezuelan food economy. Over several decades of 
operation, the vision behind VBEC took several different concrete forms, including the 
construction of a remarkably profitable chain of supermarkets, the establishment of 
several model farms, and a fish processing business.10 A closer look at one of VBEC’s 
subsidiaries, Industria Láctea de Carabobo (INLACA), offers insights into just how 
complicated the politics of food distribution could get in a business intended to produce 
both sustainable profits and broader social progress. 
INLACA 
Milk for the Masses 
Prior to the 1940s, the Venezuelan dairy industry could barely be considered an industry 
at all. As in many countries in Europe and Latin America, consumption of fresh milk 
was extremely stratified by economic class and geography. Fresh milk was not really 
for the masses, but instead for concentrated pockets of middle- and upper-class 
urbanites. Daily fluid milk consumption in the capital Caracas was estimated in the 
1930s at 18 liters per year per person, essentially the amount needed for affluent 
residents to enjoy the liquid stimulant café con leche. (By comparison, annual fresh 
milk consumption in 1930 London was 139 liters per year, and in Zurich 230 liters per 
year).11 
Venezuela’s first—and for several decades, only—milk processing plant 
equipped with modern technology was built in 1915. It was owned by the dictator Juan 
Vicente Gómez, who treated the business much like his other enterprises, using the reins 
of the state to ensure monopoly power and distributing the firm’s profits to cronies who 
in turn assured Gómez’s political power. The plant distributed packaged butter and 
some cheese, primarily to affluent consumers in Caracas. After 1937, during the López 
Contreras presidency, several modern pasteurization plants were built in Caracas and 
Valencia to deliver fresh fluid milk to elite urban residents. The rest of the country, as 
well as working-class city dwellers, relied almost entirely on reconstituted milk made 
from imported dried milk powder. Cheese, in the form of queso de mano, played an 
important part in the Venezuelan diet but was produced mainly in small batches directly 
on farms. Queso de mano, as the name suggests, required little in the way of capital 
investment or technological sophistication for either production or distribution. One 
Rockefeller associate described such cheese in 1943 as “of questionable qualities” and 
suggested that the ample milk supplies of the sparsely populated Maracaibo Basin, if 
only they could instead be transported to larger cities in fluid milk form, would “effect a 
salutary change.”12 
In 1946 Acción Democrática began a push to transform the dairy economy of 
Venezuela. The goal was to improve the quality and availability of fluid milk without 
increasing retail prices. Making milk available to the masses, and not solely to what 
Romulo Betancourt often called the “élite caraqueña” (Caracas elite), was very much in 
line with the populist-consumerist politics of the Acción Democrática regime. Indeed, 
prior to coming to power Betancourt had criticized the military leaders of the Gomecista 
era for allowing a “milk deficit” that prevented workers and peasants from being able to 
afford nutritious milk for their children. Once in power, Betancourt authorized the 
Corporación Venezolana de Fomento to purchase two existing pasteurizing plants in 
Caracas, merging them into a single state-owned company, SILSA (Sindicato de la 
Leche, S.A.). The firm focused on reconstituted milk, selling at half the price of fresh 
milk.13 
During Nelson Rockefeller’s visits with Betancourt in 1947, he was shown 
SILSA’s operations. Caracas residents waited in long lines to purchase the low-price 
reconstituted milk from what was commonly referred to as a “mechanical cow.” Acción 
Democrática representatives asked Rockefeller to “give serious consideration” to 
“taking the leadership” in constructing similar milk processing facilities in other major 
cities, including Maracaibo, Valencia, Barquisimeto, San Cristobal, and Barcelona. 
Enthusiasm was high among all involved. After receiving formal approval from IBEC 
headquarters in New York in May 1947, VBEC representatives began purchasing 
equipment and designing a model processing plant.14  
There was, however, a crucial problem with the “mechanical cow.” Although 
half-price reconstituted government milk had obvious price advantages for working-
class consumers, it was beset by inherent questions of trust and legitimacy. Most 
problematic were rumors suggesting that SILSA’s milk was so cheap because it was 
adulterated with lime and chalk. The rumors, though false, highlight how the 
distribution of food, particularly highly perishable food such as fluid milk, generally 
involves a complicated balancing act between legitimacy, trust, and price.15  
An organization, whether public or private, that can provide wider, more 
affordable, or more certain access to food can gain or enhance its institutional 
legitimacy. Failure to do so, as the literature on the moral economy of food has 
repeatedly shown, can lead to mass rejection of the legitimacy of entire classes of 
organization—e.g., “middlemen,” grain speculators, chain stores, local and national 
governments.16 The ability of consumers to trust an organization that distributes food is 
of course shaped by general attitudes of legitimacy, but also by the extent to which 
asymmetries of information between producers and consumers are either lessened or 
increased as food moves through the chain of distribution. Trust is severely undermined 
during food scares and crises involving pathogens such as E. coli and salmonella, or in 
the case of milk, tuberculosis bacteria. Public and private organizations spent much of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries devising institutional means of ensuring trust in 
perishable foods—with mixed results—including the rise of branded packages, the 
development of inspection and certification regimes, and the deployment of 
phytosanitary standards.17  
Making milk cheaper, then, was simply not enough for Acción Democrática. 
Given Venezuela’s recent political history of corruption and dictatorship, in many ways 
it was more important for the social democratic government to use milk distribution as a 
means of securing trust and legitimacy than as a program in reducing the price of food. 
The politics of food became even more central to Acción Democrática’s fortunes in 
February 1948, when Rómulo Gallegos took office after having won a landslide victory 
in what is considered the first legitimately democratic election in Venezuelan history. 
On the eve of his presidency, Gallegos pledged to “raise the standard of living of 
Venezuelans, both in cities and on the farms,” making it clear that agricultural 
productivity and lower food prices were high priorities.18 Relying on a combination of 
“mechanical cows” and foreign capitalists whose fortunes had been made in part from 
exploiting Venezuela’s petroleum resources was perhaps not the most politically 
palatable route to take. This helps explain why, in March 1948, representatives of the 
Gallegos government surprised the Rockefeller team by declaring they “did not want to 
participate in any manner in the milk company, and would prefer that VBEC abandon 
the project.” But with more than $300,000 already invested, VBEC’s managers were not 
inclined to give up so easily.19 
A series of negotiations led to an agreement in mid-1948: VBEC would move 
away from reconstituted milk and instead work with the Gallegos government to 
pioneer a fresh fluid milk industry. Inherently this would require some means of 
boosting local production of fresh milk, rather than relying on imports of powdered 
milk from the United States. It would require efficient transportation of Venezuelan 
milk from farms to pasteurization plants. And it would require the construction of a 
distribution system for customers who were largely unaccustomed to drinking milk that 
had never been in powder form.20 None of these three challenges was minor. Indeed, in 
the preceding decades in the United States, regional and national battles over the 
production and distribution of milk had led to so many vitriolic and event violent 
episodes—including milk strikes and milk boycotts—that in 1943 a U.S. federal judge 
suggested milk had nearly been the cause of an “incipient agrarian revolution” in the 
1930s and that over the recent course of American history milk had “provok[ed] as 
much human strife and nastiness as strong alcoholic beverages.” In the U.S., the 
response to this milk problem in the 1930s entailed a complicated political 
infrastructure of regional milk marketing orders, antitrust enforcement, agreements with 
labor unions, and technological developments in trucking. Even with this thick web of 
regulatory intervention, in many ways the acrimony over the politics of milk 
distribution continued to rankle U.S. consumers, workers, business managers, and 
policymakers well into the 1950s.21 
The Gallegos government did not follow the American approach of deep 
regulatory intervention into the dairy economy. Instead the initial focus was on direct 
subsidies. To entice Venezuelan farmers to produce more high-quality milk and wean 
the nation off imported powder, the Gallegos government instituted a base payment for 
dairy farmers, to be paid through milk bottling plants.22 This was in part a response to 
the distinctive environment and geography of Venezuelan agriculture. Raising dairy 
cattle in any climate is subject to constraints of seasonality, as cows always produce 
significantly more milk when they are able to dine on juicy grasses, but in a tropical 
climate with widely varying cycles of rainy and dry seasons the problem is exacerbated. 
Generally rain benefits pastures for cattle grazing, but too much rain makes them 
unusable, while prolonged dry periods severely restrict milk production. Most of the 
cattle raised in Venezuela were crossbreeds well adapted to the extremes of the tropical 
climate, being a cross of Criollo and Zebu with some genetic material from Holstein and 
Brown Swiss cattle, but adaptation to tropical conditions did not make the cattle 
especially well-suited to year-round mass production of milk. A subsidy to dairy 
farmers, then, was expected to provide incentives to farmers to specialize in milk 
production, investing in dairy herds bred specifically to produce milk as well as 
enabling the purchase of concentrated feedstuff additives to boost production in off-
seasons. Rockefeller’s team at VBEC agreed to support the initiative by building a 
model dairy farm at Chirgua, about 150km west of Caracas on an abandoned coffee 
estate in the state of Carabobo. The managers of the dairy farm would provide technical 
advice to Venezuelan farmers, encouraging them to adopt American dairy science and 
technology.23 
 In autumn 1948 there was reason for optimism both among Acción Democrática 
supporters and the managers of VBEC. Rockefeller’s team was busy building model 
farms and designing model dairy plants, intent upon demonstrating the power of 
American capital to deliver fresh milk to the masses. But what was already a 
complicated political situation became only more so in November 1948, when military 
officer Marcos Pérez Jiménez orchestrated a successful coup against the Gallegos 
government, establishing a new dictatorship that would last a decade.  
Legitimacy, Trust, and Competition 
Pérez Jiménez initially took power through force, but maintained power through 
spectacles of consumer plenty. With world oil prices steadily rising in the 1950s, the 
military regime invested heavily in public infrastructure, visibly proclaiming 
Venezuela’s importance on the world stage through concrete testaments to modernist 
progress, from bridges to museums to stadiums. Pérez Jiménez staked his regime’s 
claim to legitimacy on the ability to efficiently deliver the material goods of mid-
century capitalism, critiquing the Gallegos presidency and Acción Democrática less for 
their ideology than for their ineptitude.24 Thus, a sweeping (and notoriously repressive) 
transformation of political leadership did not necessarily dictate a fundamental 
transformation of the VBEC milk project. Delivering affordable milk to the masses, 
previously a project in social democracy, remained an important goal under the military 
dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez. 
The demise of Acción Democrática and the rise of a military dictatorship reliant 
on harmonious relations with foreign-owned petroleum companies meant that initially 
VBEC’s operations were left largely alone by the new government. In early 1949 
VBEC negotiated a deal with a group of Venezuelan businessmen to purchase their 
assets in an outdated milk processing plant in Valencia in exchange for a minority share 
in a new VBEC subsidiary, Industria Láctea de Carabobo (INLACA), a joint venture 
with U.S.-based Golden State Dairies. Rockefeller’s team took on substantial debt to 
update the plant’s technology. By the end of its first full year of operation INLACA 
could report numerous successes. In October 1949 the firm received its first license to 
distribute fresh milk in the Caracas area as well as Valencia, and was quickly selling its 
“entire supply” of upwards of 13,000 liters of milk per day. Some 1,200 liters of that 
supply had recently been procured from the “El Manglar” hacienda, a grade A milk 
producer equipped with modern refrigeration technology and “one of the finest 
operations in Venezuela” according to INLACA’s first manager, E. G. Van Wagner, 
formerly of Golden State Dairies.25  
Sales successes for INLACA continued to mount in 1950 and 1951. In the first 
three months of 1950, the firm earned double its expected income. By the end of the 
year the firm declared a net income of $112,227, on sales of over 5.7 million quarts of 
pasteurized milk and more than 67,000 quarts of ice cream. Salesmen assigned to 
specific districts in Valencia and Caracas replicated American techniques of 
encouraging additional milk consumption, including offering deals on cheese and ice 
cream. By 1951, Edward Kimball, a former food procurement officer for the City of 
New York, had replaced Van Wagner as manager of INLACA. Kimball proudly 
reported on the success of INLACA in proving that private enterprise could provide 
incentives to dairy farmers to produce more milk, noting that INLACA offered a 
guaranteed year-round market at reliable prices. By the end of 1951, twice as many 
suppliers (70) were delivering raw milk to the firm than had done so in 1949; some 
suppliers were shipping milk as far as 250 kilometers via refrigerated truck to Valencia. 
INLACA’s milk travelled to consumers in “modern hygienic paper” cartons, rather than 
glass bottles, delivered to more than 10,000 homes daily via its house-to-house sales 
network. Sales were, as Kimball succinctly noted, “most satisfactory,” leading to a tidy 
net profit in 1951 of $207,500.26 
While INLACA was busily demonstrating the efficiency of its privately owned 
operations, its main competitor remained the state-owned SILSA. As with any food 
distribution business, competition was waged on two fronts, in both the consumer 
market and the supplier market. Consumers sought reliable, trustworthy food at the 
lowest possible price; suppliers sought reliable, trustworthy payments at the highest 
possible price. For milk processors the balancing act between the interests of producers 
and consumers was even more complicated than in many lines of the food industry, as 
the intense seasonality of milk production—which in Venezuela was (and is) 
particularly pronounced due to the tropical climate—meant that an equilibrium between 
supply and demand was hard to come by and was always intensely politicized. In the 
United States, as noted earlier, this unavoidable conflict over a “fair price” for milk led 
to the development of an elaborate regulatory regime meant to maintain systems of 
“orderly marketing” from the 1930s onward. In Venezuela, no such regulatory regime 
existed. Partly as a consequence, INLACA and SILSA experimented with a variety of 
competitive tactics to build their customer and supplier bases. In 1951, for example, 
INLACA sold quarts of home-delivered milk in Caracas for 1.25 bolivars; SILSA sold 
its quarts for only Bs. 1, as its customers resided primarily in the less affluent sections 
of the city, while INLACA dominated sales in middle-class areas. The following year, 
SILSA increased its payments to farmers by 5 centimos per liter, threatening to poach 
some of INLACA’s most reliable producers. In response, manager Edward Kimball 
informed the board of directors that he refused to let INLACA become a “national 
parasite” like SILSA and would demand a hearing with the Minister of Fomento.27 
For his part the Minister of Fomento had, according to Venezuelan newspapers, 
become “acquainted with the big profits being made by both producers and pasteurizing 
companies.” The primary profiteer, it was reported, was INLACA. Government 
officials began devising plans to intervene much more heavily in the burgeoning dairy 
industry, potentially introducing some American-style regulatory functions such as 
pricing systems based on a combination of geographical region, milk quality, and 
whether consumers’ milk was store-bought or home-delivered. In early 1952 the 
government formalized a new approach, setting a maximum retail price for milk with 
the intent of enabling Venezuelan milk distributors who had previously been undersold 
by INLACA to compete on price, even without home delivery. Ironically, Edward 
Kimball’s response to the state’s price ceiling was to request permission from the board 
of directors to dramatically expand sales, buying raw milk increasingly from farms near 
Maracaibo, 700km west of Caracas. At the end of 1952, INLACA reported a 69% 
increase in production over the previous year, and although the year was profitable, the 
net income was lower than the prior year due to the price ceilings.28 
Thus as of 1954 INLACA was clearly supporting the mission of its parent 
VBEC, churning out reliable profits by selling affordable milk, setting an example for 
domestic firms to emulate. But several of VBEC’s other subsidiaries, particularly its 
farming operations, had performed exceptionally poorly. Consequently, in 1954 VBEC 
was liquidated, with all assets merged into New York-based IBEC. All shares in the 
firm previously owned by the Venezuelan government and by foreign oil companies 
were acquired by IBEC, leaving control and ownership over INLACA firmly in the 
hands of a New York-based corporation strongly associated with Nelson A. Rockefeller. 
With the full support of IBEC’s directors, INLACA continued to rapidly expand its 
operations in Venezuela. Confident of its buyer power, the firm began insisting that all 
120 of its producers install refrigerated bulk tanks on their farms, an expensive 
investment in the milk supply chain that effectively signalled to farmers they either 
needed to boost their production or exit the market. INLACA’s milk was distributed in 
40 towns and cities, reaching beyond the federal district of Caracas into eight other 
states in the capital, central, central-western, and llanos regions. Sales of Bs. 22 million 
produced substantial profits of Bs 898,000 in 1954.29 
The politics of INLACA’s business took on new layers of complexity after the 
merger into IBEC, imbuing competition in the milk marketplace with new questions of 
legitimacy. As one IBEC representative familiar with Venezuelan politics noted, the 
company was “considered foreign” and faced a significant challenge rooted in the 
agrarian infrastructure laid in the Gomecista era, as “the large dairy farms are the 
property of strong capitalists, who directly or indirectly, have a positive voice in the 
government.” Such producers might very well comply with demands to industrialize 
their operations with the instalment of bulk tanks (thus erecting barriers to entry for 
smaller dairy farms), but they might also turn to government officials or the state-owned 
SILSA to pressure the American-owned firm to increase its prices for raw milk. Or, as 
INLACA managers increasingly worried in 1955, well-capitalized dairy farmers could 
themselves become competitors; as one report put it, “Everyone in Venezuela who owns 
a cow thinks he should have a milk plant.” Groups of around a dozen milk producers 
were increasingly forming joint stock companies to establish their own pasteurization 
plants, generally delivering direct to retail food stores and restaurants rather than bother 
with home delivery service. With more entrants to the milk distribution business 
competing with INLACA and SILSA, but with all distributors limited by law to 
maximum consumer prices of Bs. 1 per liter, INLACA increasingly turned to price wars 
to maintain its market share. In 1955 the company sold at a loss in its largest market of 
Caracas in 1955, although nationwide sales that year reached Bs. 24.6 million, with 
profits of Bs. 691,100.30  
The competition became intense enough by 1956 that IBEC’s directors believed 
a crossroads had been reached: either INLACA should be sold outright, or it should 
redouble its energies and strongly assert its dominance in both the supply chain and in 
retail markets. INLACA was one of IBEC’s most consistently profitable divisions (its 
Venezuelan supermarkets the other), so the decision was nearly foreordained. First 
INLACA demanded that politically connected dairy farmers accept lower prices, even 
for milk cooled on the farm in bulk tanks, otherwise the firm would liquidate its assets 
and cease operations. Once the producers fell in line, INLACA opened a new front in 
the retail price war, introducing “7 Lochas” brand homogenized milk. Selling 
homogenized pasteurized milk was an innovation for the Venezulean market, as was the 
idea of making a brand mark out of a specific retail price—locha being the colloquial 
term for a 1/8th bolivar coin worth 12.5 centimos, thus 7 Lochas sold for 87.5 centimos. 
By May, Edward Kimball gloated that 7 Lochas had “caused quite a stir,” forcing 
competitors to slash their own prices, though he acknowledged that “tak[ing] the 
offensive in order to protect its market” would drive the firm’s accounts into the red for 
the short term. Still, Kimball remained confident that the plan would not set off political 
retribution as it would require INLACA to source more of its milk from the western 
state of Zulia, a land of productive pastures which government officials had openly 
declared ought to “be the ‘Wisconsin’ of Venezuela,” mass-producing “cheaper milk” 
for the central and capital districts.31 
Nearly a decade into its operations, INLACA had established its legitimacy as a 
large-scale private enterprise despite being foreign-owned and repeatedly antagonizing 
both its competitors and its suppliers. INLACA’s managers had forged relationships of 
trust with thousands of Venezuelan consumers, who had integrated pasteurized fluid 
milk into their diets to such an extent that Edward Kimball predicted 1957 sales of Bs. 
1.2 million and suggested offering shareholders an “extra dividend” despite the impacts 
of ongoing price wars. And the firm was clearly meeting its intended mission as a spur 
to competition, using its concentrated economic power to push both its distributing 
competitors and its farm suppliers to seek efficiencies in production and economies of 
scale and scope as they ramped up the dairy industry in Venezuela. Over the course of 
1948-1958, when the Venezuelan population grew by three percent annually, milk 
consumption increased by ten percent, so that overall consumption doubled within a 
decade.32 
Then, in January 1958, a coup d’etat ended the Pérez Jiménez regime amidst 
rising dissatisfaction with the dictator’s claims to legitimacy, spurred on by his 1957 
decision to cancel a promised election that he realized he would not win. In the wake of 
the revolution, after a short period of caretaker governance by a military junta, elections 
held in autumn 1958 returned Romulo Betancourt and Acción Democrática to power. 
Revolution, Reform, and Retreat 
Initial reaction to the coup was quite upbeat among Rockefeller associates on the 
ground in Venezuela. As one IBEC manager put it, “we have many friends in the new 
government” and the prospects of “returning to a democratic and representative form of 
government” seemed promising for the milk business. Yet events of September 
highlighted the instability of INLACA’s political position, when yet another military 
rebellion, though quickly quashed by government troops, disrupted the movement of 
milk nationwide for several days. In response, a critical friend of INLACA suggested 
the firm ought to “do something more than it has done in the past in the way of building 
up good will, or let us call it public relations.” Raking in profits and spurring ever-more 
intense competition in the dairy industry was not enough; the firm needed to cooperate 
with the new leaders of the country to rebuild the public’s trust, not just in the quality of 
its milk but also in the entire political economy of food distribution.33 
Thus in early 1959, as Romulo Betancourt officially retook office as the nation’s 
president, INLACA also changed its leadership, with Bernardo Jofre replacing Edward 
Kimball as the firm’s general manager. Unlike Kimball, Spanish-born Jofre had a knack 
for understanding the nuances of Latin American politics, having made his professional 
name as a writer of political editorials in Caracas before serving as Rockefeller’s Head 
of Public Relations for the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs during 
World War II. Although IBEC’s directors put their faith in Jofre to navigate INLACA 
through Venezuela’s new political territory, they also reduced their financial stake in the 
firm, selling half of the company’s shares to Foremost Dairies, the U.S.’s fourth-largest 
dairy, which had acquired INLACA’s founding minority shareholder Golden State in 
1954.34 
Jofre’s first opportunity for burnishing INLACA’s political reputation came in 
March 1959 when the firm was contracted by the Betancourt government to deliver 
fresh milk to every school student in Caracas. Jofre had his “fingers crossed” for the 
success of the program, recognizing it not only as a good political move but also as “a 
free sales promotion for fresh milk.” The firm’s significance in Venezuela’s domestic 
economy was substantial, accounting for 37% of fluid milk sales in the country, with 
the majority of its supplies now coming from the western state of Zulia surrounding the 
shores of Lake Maracaibo. Yet there remained significant opportunity for growth, as 
Venezuelan per capita dairy consumption, despite having doubled in the previous 
decade, remained at half that of the United States. Furthermore, the country continued 
to rely heavily on imported dry whole milk for reconstitution, undercutting markets for 
domestic dairy farmers and undermining incentives for increased specialization in 
dairying, even in Zulia, the would-be “Wisconsin” of Venezuela.35 
Indeed it was in the area of farms and farm politics that one of the most striking 
contrasts between Venezuela’s dairy economy and that of the United States became 
increasingly apparent. The original plan behind VBEC, with the backing of Acción 
Democrática, had been to use food distribution enterprises—not only milk, but also 
supermarkets—to spearhead an agro-industrial transformation of the countryside, 
spurring rural development in an effort to wean the country off food imports. The 
impact of INLACA on dairy farming illuminates the mixed results of this project. On 
the one hand, INLACA had provided market incentives to some Venezuelan cattle 
farmers to specialize in and boost production of fresh milk. Yet those incentives 
primarily appealed to large landowners already well capitalized. As a result, the 
fundamental structure of the rural dairy economy remained largely unchanged, certainly 
not revolutionized. On the other hand, the impacts that INLACA had produced on the 
farm economy were almost wholly a product of private market incentives, with 
remarkably little government involvement in either the infrastructure of the rural 
economy or the regulation of wholesale or retail markets, other than the provision of a 
base subsidy to dairy producers which primarily benefited large landowners. In the late-
1950s United States, farmers large and small relied on a dense infrastructure in which 
state research universities, federal scientists and policymakers, state-federal cooperative 
extension agents, and large-scale agribusinesses ensured that farmers were always 
aware of the latest scientific and technological developments that could boost 
production. American farmers who failed to hop onto what Minnesota farm economist 
Willard Cochrane labeled a “technological treadmill” in 1958, e.g. by investing in a 
bulk milk tank or converting to an all-Holstein dairy herd to increase output, could 
expect to have their operations bought out by those farmers who did. In Venezuela, by 
contrast, the federal government invested very little in the infrastructure of agribusiness. 
There were no agricultural market reports—except for milk price reports delivered a full 
year after the information would have been relevant to producers—no livestock 
reporting, no federally maintained grades or standards for farm products or processed 
foods, no federal inspection service, and very little technical advice provided to farmers. 
Thus, although producing and distributing milk was an intensely political enterprise in 
Venezuela, the political questions tended to focus on the end consumer with relatively 
little attention paid to the food system as a whole. Farm politics, in other words, had 
been left to private businesses in the distribution end of the food chain to hammer out. 
Strategy was forged in the halls of government, but operations were managed almost 
entirely by private businesses.36  
It was not the case, however, that the new Betancourt administration had no 
interest in intervening in INLACA’s business or the dairy economy more generally. In 
spring 1959, Jofre informed IBEC directors of his concern that Betancourt might hold 
the company to its original agreement to have Venezuelans take over ownership of the 
firm after ten years, even though VBEC had been liquidated. Over the next several 
years, IBEC responded to such pressure by selling off its non-voting shares, so that by 
1963 Venezuelan investors held a 47.9% stake in the firm, although IBEC maintained 
its controlling stock. INLACA found more difficulty in its ongoing attempts to negotiate 
better terms with its milk suppliers. A September 1961 attempt to reduce the prices paid 
to farmers led the Ministry of Agriculture to announce that “any attempt to arbitrarily 
reduce the price of milk [would] be counteracted by application of a special clause of 
the Agrarian Law [of 1960].” This legislation called for an immediate transformation of 
the country’s farm economy, a transition to full agricultural self-sufficiency. The 
agrarian reform act included provisions for land redistribution, resettlement of 
subsistence farmers, offers of credit to small farmers, government investment in 
marketing facilities, guaranteed farm prices, and improved rural housing for 
farmworkers. Much of the political attention to the 1960 Agrarian Law, at the time and 
for years afterward, focused on the promise (ultimately undelivered) to redistribute land 
to small-scale producers. Yet the government’s reaction to INLACA’s attempted price 
cut illustrated the day-to-day reality that power in the countryside remained firmly in 
the hand of large, well-capitalized producers who maintained strong influence in the 
ministry of agriculture.37  
In 1965 the Acción Democrática government introduced a dramatic revision to 
dairy policy, attempting to reinforce the aims of the 1960 Agrarian Law by making 
Venezuela self-sufficient in milk production. Consumer prices for both fluid milk and 
milk powder were adjusted to the level of domestic production costs. In part the new 
policy was a response to positive signs in the rural economy; from 1961 to 1965 milk 
production increased 145 percent, from 444.6 million liters to 646.1 million. The intent 
behind increased consumer prices was to provide incentives to Venezuelan farmers to 
meet domestic demand for milk, driving foreign imported milk out of the market 
entirely. Prices for reconstituted milk—still primarily consumed by low-income 
citizens—suddenly rose around 30 percent, while pasteurized fluid milk prices 
increased by 12.5 percent. As a result, per capita consumption of milk fell quickly back 
to mid-1950s levels. The directors of IBEC began considering full divestment of their 
milk business in Venezuela, noting that INLACA was “placed squarely between the 
consumers and the farmers, and is subject to all nature of political and economic forces, 
generally acting contrary to Inlaca’s interests.” Such discussions continued for several 
years at IBEC headquarters. Continued profitability of the milk business made IBEC’s 
directors loath to pull out; indeed in 1968 the company declared expansion of INLACA 
to be a “priority.” But when Edward Kimball returned as head of INLACA in 1971, he 
was struck by rising hostility against U.S.-owned companies operating in Venezuela and 
began pressuring New York to sell its remaining shares in the firm. Full divestiture 
ultimately came in 1974, with ownership of the firm shifting to a group of Venezuelan 
cattle dealers who renamed the firm C. A. Industries Lara-Carabobo.38  
Five years before IBEC pulled out of the milk distribution business in 
Venezuela, an American economist produced a report on the country’s farm and food 
economy for the Ford Foundation. Surveying the nation’s food distribution system as a 
whole, Louis E. Heaton saw it “characterized by few strong points and many weak 
ones.” Among the strong points was the distribution of milk, anchored by 19 large 
pasteurization plants and five powdered milk plants. But Heaton upheld the consensus 
view that rural producers, supported by government subsidies, had not really invested in 
the production of milk for the masses. “Moreover,” Heaton declared, “there is a 
constant crisis with respect to policies to be followed, and widely differing arguments 
are presented by the various interests involved.” The one thing everyone could agree on 
was that conflicts over the place and price of milk in Venezuela’s economy were 
unlikely to end anytime soon.39  
Conclusion 
For just over a quarter of a century, American capitalists owned and operated a milk 
distribution firm in Venezuela, delivering milk through multiple political revolutions 
and constantly beset by “widely differing arguments” as to the purpose of the company. 
At first called upon to deliver milk to the masses as a developmental project in state-
backed social democracy, the firm proved most successful in the 1950s as a for-profit 
firm devoted primarily to buying milk from affluent farmers to process into pasteurized 
milk for upper-income consumers. Contestation over whether the firm should be a 
Venezuelan-owned company or an American-funded model of capitalist efficiency 
reflected the deeply politicized position of the firm. As a food distribution business, 
INLACA was inherently caught in the middle of competing demands from producers 
and consumers, a fraught position in any context that was further amplified by the fact 
that multiple political regimes in the country saw the distribution of milk as a significant 
aspect of their claims to legitimacy. It is remarkable that the company was as successful 
as it was at delivering the goods, though it is also worth noting how fundamentally the 
enterprise failed to deliver the transformative political results expected of it at its 
founding. 
At core the history of INLACA highlights the importance of food sovereignty to 
Venezuela’s twentieth-century political dynamics. The term “food sovereignty” only 
came into formal usage in the early 1980s, emerging from a Mexican government 
program intended to reframe international agricultural politics away from quantitatively 
measured national “self-sufficiency” in food to an approach of “national control over 
diverse aspects of the food chain, thus reducing foreign capital and imports of basic 
foods, inputs and technology.”40 For petroleum-rich, exceptionally urbanized Venezuela 
at mid-century, “self-sufficiency” in quantitative terms—whether calories, liters, or 
bushels—was by any objective measure a misplaced goal. Rationally it made sense to 
export valuable oil and import cheap food. But notions of sovereignty—of national 
pride, of government authority and legitimacy, of localized control over the meanings 
and structures and enterprises of food provisioning—challenged such quantitative, 
rational measures. Thus in the Agrarian Law of 1960, Venezuela declared a goal of 
“self-sufficiency,” but the specifics of the program were focused on redistributing 
economic and social power—sovereignty—by broadening access to land and markets 
and healthful foods throughout the agrifood system. The long-term failure of the 
reforms to achieve either quantitative self-sufficiency or substantive qualitative 
transformations in the agrifood economy, however, illustrate an essential tension 
embedded in food sovereignty: achieving redistribution of power in the agrifood system 
inherently requires significance exercise of state authority, yet by redistributing such 
power the state opens itself up to threats, including questions regarding the legitimacy 
of the government in power.41 The history of INLACA clearly illustrates such tensions, 
as over the course of 27 years it was at times called upon to bolster the legitimacy of 
state interventions in the food economy and at other times shunned as a threat to 
Venezuelan national identity and self-sufficiency.  
In the twenty years following IBEC’s decision to pull out of the Venezuelan 
milk business, the project of agrarian transformation continued to face significant 
challenges. From 1984 to 1988, an Acción Democrática regime led by Jaime Lusinchi 
once again introduced agricultural policies intended to achieve increased domestic 
output and food self-sufficiency, again primarily through provision of subsidies and 
credit to producers rather than through investment in the infrastructure of agricultural 
production or distribution. But continued dependence on oil exports at a time of great 
instability in oil markets led to an economic crisis, to which the next Acción 
Democrática president, Carlos Andrés Pérez, responded by instituting a number of harsh 
neoliberal economic reforms in 1989, including slashing of farm subsidies. One 
immediate consequence was a steep decline in milk production, so that between 1989 
and 1992 the amount of milk available per capita decreased by 45 percent. Dairying 
remained a labor-intensive rural enterprise in an exceptionally urbanized country. In the 
early 1990s, more than an hour and a half of labor was required to produce a liter of 
pasteurized milk in Venezuela, when the same took four minutes in the United States.42  
One significant impetus behind the 1990s revolt against Acción Democrática 
that ultimately led to the 1998 election of Hugo Chávez was the widespread perception 
of Acción Democrática’s repeated failures to achieve its promises of national food 
sovereignty. Agrarian reform measures, including mass redistribution of land to peasant 
and tenant farmers, have been among the most far-reaching components of Chávez’s 
Bolivarian Revolution. Yet Chávez and his successor Nicolás Maduro faced many of 
the same challenges as their predecessors, including the continued political and 
economic dominance of large-scale rural landowners, as well as an ongoing lack of state 
capacity to implement and operationalize meaningful reforms on the ground to achieve 
food self-sufficiency.43 Venezuela has thus remained highly dependent on imports to 
meet its food needs. And in the contemporary milk economy, it also relies on foreign 
multinational enterprises to distribute milk: the remains of INLACA, though sold to 
Venezuelan investors in 1974, now belong to Dairy Partners Americas, a joint venture 
between global giants Nestlé and Fonterra established in 2003. Whether such a global 
milk distribution enterprise can maintain legitimacy and trust in a political climate 
marked by intense debates over the balance between state and business power and 
rapidly deteriorating economic conditions remains uncertain.44  
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